In my December 2021 post MIB (C’s Movie), I examined the relationship between the “Zionist KGB” – the political intelligence apparatus and its branches – and the MIB, the intelligence system dealing with extra-terrestrial affairs, wherever such a system exists.
A friend argued these were two entirely different films; Chapa noted that the actors and directors, more often than not, are the same.
Still, for decades a clear separation seemed to hold – until recently.
The “Blue-Collar” Layer
In the second half of the 1970s, a phenomenon began to surface-one that would return in waves over the decades:
a growing gap between the managing elite of the security and intelligence apparatus and what can be described, without contempt, as its “blue-collar” layer-the operational ranks, field personnel, technicians, guards, handlers; those in constant, direct contact with “the problem.”
This was the layer most exposed to daily friction with anomalies, irregularities, and a persistent, poorly defined threat. Over time, it developed a distinctive mixture of suspicion, popular religiosity, nationalism, and at times paranoid or even annihilationist worldviews.
Not coincidentally, it was precisely here that fertile ground emerged for ideas of unified arenas: there is no real distinction between “inside” and “outside,” no meaningful difference between a political enemy, a cultural enemy, or a “foreign body.” All are perceived as facets of the same overarching threat.
Why It Didn’t Work Then – or Later
In the late 1970s, initial attempts were made to fuse the MIB and the Zionist KGB (KGBZ) into a single conceptual and operational framework. The planned establishment of the “Authority for the Struggle Against Foreign Bodies” was meant to serve as the instrument for this fusion-a super-agency combining political intelligence, internal security, and extra-terrestrial threats under one ideological umbrella.
But it didn’t happen-at least not fully.
Several explanations can be offered, none of them mutually exclusive:
Elite resistance – senior leadership understood that such a fusion would blur lines of responsibility and undermine existing mechanisms of control.
International concern – an overt linkage between “alien” discourse and national security risked being perceived as dangerous delusion, potentially harming external legitimacy.
Ideological overload – the religious–messianic elements made it difficult to establish a stable, professional common language.
And above all: the absence of the right figure-someone capable of speaking both the language of the field and that of the establishment, and translating one into the other.
Even when the idea resurfaced in later waves, it was never fully realized.
Netanyahu, too, failed over the years to fuse the operations of all these bodies-and perhaps never truly tried. Contrary to his public image as an all-controlling figure, Netanyahu operated primarily through balance, fragmentation, and internal competition among agencies: the Shin Bet, Mossad, Military Intelligence, the police, special units, and semi-extramural bodies. This fragmentation served him politically; it enabled control without creating a single center of power that might slip beyond his grasp.
But in doing so, the historical separation was preserved:
the MIB, insofar as it exists, remained in the shadows; the KGBZ continued dealing with internal political matters; and the ideological synthesis-the one that seeks to view internal enemies, external enemies, and “foreign bodies” as part of a single cosmic threat-never gained official standing at the decision-making level.
The gap between the elite and the “blue-collar” layer remained intact, if unresolved.
The project stalled, was sidelined, broken into fragments, but it did not disappear. It merely waited for a moment, and for a figure, capable of bringing it back to the center of the stage.
David Zini
This is where David Zini enters the picture-not by chance, but as a product of a long process.
Zini does not arrive merely as another officer at the top; he stands at the intersection of field awareness, clear ideological identity, and deep familiarity with the security apparatus itself.
His background, including the connection to the Bnei David preparatory program, is not a minor biographical detail but a key to understanding the context. Bnei David is not just a framework for training soldiers and officers; it is an institution aimed at shaping a sense of mission: a close integration of security, belief, nationalism, and a perception of ongoing struggle over the character and identity of society. Within this framework, the distinction between a security threat, a cultural threat, and an ideological threat is not sharp-and is often perceived as artificial.
In this sense, Zini may be the first figure capable-and perhaps willing-to translate the “blue-collar” perspective into the language of leadership, rather than simply subjecting it to elite oversight. Unlike previous leaders, who operated through balance, division, and management of tensions among different branches, Zini may see the unification of arenas as an advantage: blurring the boundaries between internal and external, political and security, “foreign threat” and domestic challenge.
If this is indeed the direction, it is not merely an organizational or personal shift, but a renewed attempt to complete an old project-one that was left unfinished in the 1970s and never revived-this time from the center of gravity of the system itself, not from its peripheries.
Even if it is unclear who actually controls the Israeli MIB, and whether it can even be spoken of as a sovereign, independent, or cohesive entity—the signs point to the fact that David Zini, if he indeed consolidates his power, will in any case strive to subordinate this domain to himself. Whether through formal annexation to the Shin Bet (or whatever "קגב״צ" refers to), whether through indirect frameworks—budgetary or conceptual—or whether by changing the language of justification—it is hard to envision a scenario in which this arena remains outside the aspiration for unification.
The key is not administrative control, but the integration of what is perceived as “the real research” into a single conceptual framework of struggle: one that no longer makes a principled distinction between aliens and “leftists,” between an extra-terrestrial threat and an internal threat, between a cosmic anomaly and a cultural anomaly. Not merely as a metaphorical comparison, but as operational and consciousness-based logic.
Epilogue / Chapa’s Note
Chapa would say that perhaps even such a shift does not take place in a purely terrestrial, internal world. It is possible that behind both the elite and the blue-collar layer, there are actors external to the terrestrial domain, operating in tension, competing or even battling one another, shaping events almost regardless of the awareness of those on the ground.
Thus, even if Zini seeks to bring the MIB under his control, the whole picture may still be part of a more complex system-where control, power, and conflict are not limited to the terrestrial realm alone.
70דוד זיני והפרויקט ה“חוצני” הבלתי־גמור של שנות ה־
"הרשות למלחמה בגופים זרים"
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